The consequences of government regulation in the post-acute care sector are not well understood. We examine the effect of entry regulation on quality of care in home health care by analyzing the universe of hospital discharges during 2006 for publicly insured beneficiaries (about 4.5 million) and subsequent home health admissions to determine whether there is a significant difference in home health utilization, hospital readmission rates, and health care expenditures in states with and without Certificate of Need laws (CON) regulating entry. We identify these effects by looking across regulated and nonregulated states within Hospital Referral Regions, which characterize well-defined health care markets and frequently cross state boundaries. We find that CON states use home health less frequently, but system-wide rehospitalization rates, overall Medicare expenditures, and home health practice patterns are similar. Removing CON for home health would have negligible system-wide effects on health care costs and quality.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of competition on quality in health care markets is not well understood. While the evidence generally points to a positive relationship between competition and quality, especially under regulated prices, the quality of care implications of policies aiming to slow the growth of health care costs by limiting firm entry and thus competition are unclear. One such policy tool is Certificate of Need (CON) laws designed to provide states with control over entry, expansions, and substantial capital investments by health care facilities. Since the effectiveness of CON laws in restricting utilization is disputed, there is large variation across states in the degree of regulatory oversight.
CON laws exist for various types of health care providers including hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers and home health agencies. CON for hospitals and to a lesser extent for nursing homes and rehabilitation centers give state governments the authority to restrict major capital investment such as the construction of new facilities, expansions to existing ones, and the purchasing of expensive technology (MHCC, 2001) .
Hence, CON imposes restrictions on both incumbent hospitals and potential entrants. This is not the case in home health, a labor intensive industry with no major capital investment, where CON operates exclusively as a mechanism to restrict entry of new home health agencies. With fewer agencies in CON markets, state regulators may be more effective at having a positive influence on standardizing the care delivered by the home health agencies in their state. However, restricted entry leads to markets with fewer providers and, thus, reduced market competition among agencies. In a market with regulated prices, such as in home health, reduced competition may have a negative effect on the quality of home health care delivered.
On the other hand, CON for home health may also influence the rate of hospital discharges to home health. With evidence that effective use of home health care services can lower the rate of hospital readmissions (Sochalski, et al. 2009 , Naylor, et al. 2004 , Penrod, et al. 1998 , Penrod, Kane and Kane 2000 , Hadley, et al. 2000 , understanding the role of CON for home health can have broad health care implications.
In particular, if there are fewer hospital discharges to home health in CON states and admissions to home health contribute to lower rates of rehospitalization, CON for home health may have important downstream effects on health care system rehospitalization rates and expenditures.
There are two main objectives of this paper. First, we will evaluate whether there are significant differences in the delivery of home health care between states with and without entry regulation in terms of the resource intensity of home health services and the quality of home health care among patients discharged to home health. Second, we will describe the broader implications of such regulations in terms of the rate of hospital discharge to home health care, overall hospital readmissions, and total health care expenditures.
BACKGROUND
Hospital expansion in the 1970s, associated with excess bed capacity (Joskow 1980) and reduced social welfare (Robinson and Luft 1985) , led to the 1974 Federal Health Planning and Resources Development Act, which mandated states to develop CON to control utilization and third-party expense by controlling or reducing supply. When states universally adopted CON for hospitals in the 1970s, 38 states also applied CON regulation to the home health care sector. When the federal mandate was repealed in 1987, only 18 states continued active CON regulations for home health care (AHPA 2005 , MHCC 2001 ).
The idea behind CON regulation was that it would prevent unnecessary duplication of services and ensure appropriate care by concentrating the location of sophisticated medical services to high-volume regional facilities with sufficient expertise and resources (Smith-Mello 2004) . Proponents of CON laws view restrictions on acquisitions and expansions of hospitals as a way to achieve this goal (Ho 2004) . Nevertheless, evidence on the effectiveness of CON in lowering hospital costs of care, procedure volume and mortality is mixed (Salkever 2000 , Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin and Rosenthal 2006 , Ho 2006 , Ho, Ku-goto and Jollis 2009 .
In home health markets, with little to no capital investment (CMS 2003) and labor as the dominating input, the potential for cost savings from major capital expansions by incumbent agencies is nonexistent. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a volumeoutcome relationship which would be needed for a home health CON to enhance quality (Kass 1987) . In home health, service delivery is decentralized and provided by individuals as opposed to teams; therefore individual-nurse volume is more relevant for outcomes than agency volume. However, since nurses tend to work at full capacity even in small-scale agencies, there is little rationale for concentrating volume at a small number of agencies through entry restrictions. An alternative rationale for CON programs in home health is that they can enforce appropriate standards of care through enhanced ability to monitor agencies. However, to date there is no evidence to suggest CON in home health care is quality enhancing.
While the effect of CON on quality of home health care is not clear, the ability for CON regulations to effectively limit entry of new agencies into the market is evident. Most states with CON regulations follow specific policies and guidelines for the approval of additional home health agencies in a given market, but in practice new agencies are rarely approved. Therefore, markets in CON-regulated states are not contested, as incumbent agencies are not threatened by potential entrants. 1 Figure 1 The Agency-HHI measures the degree of concentration for each agency in our sample. Competitive markets are defined separately for each agency based on a weighted average of the agency's market concentration in the zip-codes of the clients they serve (zip-code level HHIs are calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the zip-code and then summing the resulting numbers).
The price of a home health episode is fixed by Medicare through a Prospective Payment System (PPS) for home health services. 3 Under PPS, a single payment is given for a 60day episode of care, with payment for additional 60-day episodes if the patient is recertified for continuing home health care. The reimbursement amount is a per-episode fixed rate set at admission according to the severity of the patient's condition. To determine severity, each Medicare episode is classified into one of 80 mutually exclusive severity groups, called Home Health Resource Groups (HHRGs), which determine the payment rate. Each episode payment is adjusted for differences in labor costs across geographic areas. 4 Since prices are regulated, providers can no longer compete for patients based on price of services and instead must compete for patients on other dimensions of their services such as resource intensity or quality of care. If the regulated price is set above marginal cost for some baseline level of quality, then firms will continue to improve service delivery to try to attract more of the available pool of patients until marginal cost of delivering care equals the regulated price. Thus, economic theory suggests that market competition in the presence of regulated prices can lead to quality improvements (Beitia 2003 , Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume 2006 , Brekke, Nuschler and Straume 2007 , Calem and Rizzo 1995 , Karlsson 2007 , Gravelle and Masiero 2000 , Gravelle 1999 , Lyon 1999 , Wolinsky 1997 , Ma and Burgess 1993 , Allen and Gertler 1991 , Held and Pauly 1983 , Pope 1989 .
Most empirical studies of the relationship between competition and quality under regulated prices found more competition to result in higher quality (as measured by lower mortality) (Kessler and McClellan 2000 , Gowrisankaran and Town 2003 , Held and Pauly 1983 , Kessler and Geppert 2005 , Tay 2003 , Sari 2002 , Shen 2003 , Shorten and Hughes 1988 .
While the effect of market concentration on quality has been studied extensively in the hospital sector, this relationship has received no attention in the home health care industry. The case of competition in a hospital market will not necessarily apply to home health. Unlike hospitals, where location provides a degree of market power, home health agencies deliver services at the patient's residence. Without location as a natural barrier to competition, we might expect home health markets to be a highly competitive.
Similarly, unlike hospitals and other facilities that require major capital investments in order to become operational, home health care is labor intensive and is expected to be highly competitive absent of entry regulation. However, states have imposed an artificial barrier on the number of competitors in a given market by restricting the creation of new home health agencies through CON regulation. While regulation may be more effective with fewer agencies to regulate, the limited number of evidence-based standards of care in home health on which effective service regulation can be based suggests that market competition may provide a superior (self-enforcing) mechanism for promoting quality. With CON regulation creating potentially opposing effects on quality, the net effect becomes an empirical question.
Moreover, home health care is part of a larger health care system. More resource intensive home care may increase its use by hospital discharge planners, who would otherwise be sending the patient home (without home health care). If home health agencies are effective at preventing rehospitalization for the marginal patient they serve, increased use may reduce overall rehospitalization rates and thus offset Medicare's costs of increased home health expenditures. Therefore, the effect of competition for home health care on overall health care expenditures is ambiguous.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Following Gaynor (2006) , we base our empirical specification on the equilibrium level of quality (in a market with regulated prices). We assume that firms either maximize profit or rely on surplus to support other objectives (e.g., a nonprofit agency could have a different objective, yet rely on surplus to achieve it (Lakdawalla and Philipson 2006, David 2009) ). In addition, we assume that a welfare-maximizing regulator and utilitymaximizing consumers imperfectly observe the quality of home health services.
The equilibrium level of firm quality becomes
where p is the administratively set price per home health episode, c is the cost of a home health episode at quality level * q , and ms is the firm's market share. The right hand side variables are a function of * q because the quality level chosen by an agency is likely to affect its market share, cost, and willingness-to-pay for its services. That is, higher quality firms will have higher costs, but at the same time are likely to attract more customers, which in turn would lead to commanding a higher market share. To estimate quality with independent right hand side variables, we replace the endogenous variables with their exogenous determinants and estimate a reduced form equation. We replace cost with cost shifters, demand with demand shifters, and measures of competition with CON regulation for home health agencies.
Thus the econometric specification is:
where CS and DS are cost and demand shifters respectively. Price is the fixed Medicare price; cost shifters include market level variables that might influence factor prices such as wages, patient-agency distance, availability of labor, and density of customer base; demand shifters include patient-level variables that characterize patient illness severity and service needs as well as market-level variables that capture general service demand.
Of concern here is remaining omitted variables that could be correlated with CON and independently influence our quality indicators. The two most important are unobserved patient characteristics such as illness severity and unobserved area-level characteristics such as geographic variation in service use. If competition affects the severity of the patients admitted to the home health agency, unobserved severity (i.e., severity that is not captured by the risk adjustment) may be an issue if it independently influences the resource intensity of home health service use and health outcomes. This may occur if home health agencies that face less competitive pressure are more likely to refuse complicated cases and hence, attract low-severity cases on average. Geographic variation may be an issue if those areas that are more likely to have CON are the same areas that are more likely to otherwise utilize more health care services.
We address both of these concerns with a specification that includes market-level fixed effects (υ m ). rules are different. These HRRs are well spread across the U.S. in that they are in 32 of the 48 states in the analysis and 14 of the 18 CON states. Figure 2 illustrates the source of our identification for the case of Pennsylvania, a non-CON state, in which 9 of 17
HRRs cross state boundaries. Six of these HRRs cross into CON states (New Jersey, New
York, and West Virginia). Our main specification essentially reduces to a comparison of patients in states under CON regulation and patients in states under no entry regulation within hospital referral regions that cross state lines. This within-HRR variation excludes fixed unobserved factors tied to competition within HRRs and differential patterns of health care service use across HRRs.
METHODS

Data Sources
We constructed a data set uniquely suited for this study by linking the 100% Medicare 
Study Sample
We define our study population as fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over 65 We construct two study samples from these index hospitalizations. Our primary sample is based on home health admissions, consisting of 522,232 index hospitalizations that are followed within 3 days of the hospital discharge date by a home health admission. Our secondary sample is based on hospital discharge and is comprised of all index hospitalizations that lead to a hospital discharge. This sample excludes in-hospital deaths and discharges to hospice, long-term acute care, and inpatient rehabilitation, resulting in a sample of 4,448,479 hospital discharges. 7 Despite the fact that the hospitalizations and home health admissions for the 15% of Medicare beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans are not recorded, this is a comprehensive record of hospitalizations and home health admissions for Americans over 65 given that 95% are covered by Medicare.
Variables
The key dependent variables for the sample of home health admissions include several measures of resource intensity of home health services and rehospitalization rates as an outcome measure of quality. The resource intensity measures include the total number of visits, weighted by the skill level of the provider conducting the visit, 8 the proportion of visits by skill type (skilled nursing, home health aide, and all therapists), the length of service (number of days between the first and last visit), and the frequency of visits (weighted visits divided by length of service). We measure resource utilization within the first 60-day episode of home health care as only 10% of these index episodes of care are recertified for additional episodes beyond the first 60 days on service.
We identify readmissions rates to be our key quality related outcome measure for our sample home health admissions following a hospital discharge. Given the fact that avoiding rehospitalization is a primary goal of home health care among those who enter home health from the hospital, readmission is generally viewed as the critical outcome of home health. Moreover, mortality rates are too low in this population to be measured as a reliable outcome. Shaughnessy and colleagues (2002) found hospitalization rates after home health admission to be a valid and significant indicator of quality of home health care. We measure rehospitalizations by linking home health admission claims to all hospital discharge claims. We classified the timing of rehospitalizations into 60-day intervals following a hospital discharge (0-60 days and 60 to 120 days). For 8 There are six different home health care visit types: skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech language pathology, medical social services, and home health aide. Since these represent different intensities of care and, hence different costs of resource use, we adjusted the count of all visits for the relative value of each unit type (Welch, Wennberg and Welch 1996) . The relative value is based on the federally reported relative value units (RVUs) (Hsiao et al 1988 
Analysis
We conducted fixed-effect multivariable regression analysis of home health resource utilization, rehospitalization, and expenditures, as a function of CON and the covariates related to use and outcomes. The model used varied by outcome. We used ordinary least squares for home health services: number of visits, length of service, frequency of visits, and percent of visits by provider type. We used a GEE logistic model for the estimation of home health admissions following hospital discharge. We estimated a fully To better understand the contribution of adjustments for observable and unobservable factors we estimate the marginal effect of CON without any adjustment, with adjustments for observable factors without fixed effects, and with HRR fixed effects. One potential limitation of the fixed-effect model is that, while improving the internal validity of our estimates, the identification comes from those HRRs that cross state boundaries. These 33 HRRs represent approximately 13% of the full sample. Nevertheless, to assess the external validity of this subset, we show the adjusted subsample marginal effects for comparison to the adjusted effects for the whole sample.
RESULTS
Our primary sample consists of 522,232 hospital-to-home health transitions in 2006.
29.6% of these transitions occurred in CON states. From Table 1 , we see that home health admissions in CON states only differ slightly from non-CON states in terms of patient characteristics, with patients in CON states more likely to be older, female, black, and have heart failure and diabetes. There were more meaningful differences in the hospitals and market characteristics. Hospitals in CON states were more likely to be nonprofit, larger, and affiliated to a medical school. Markets were similar in terms of education and income levels, but CON states were less densely populated, had more hospital beds available, were more likely to have CON for hospitals, and were more likely to hospitalize patients in their last six months of life.
The home health practice pattern differences between CON and non-CON states are shown in Table 2 , highlighting a few significant differences in home health practice patterns across these states. The number of visits is essentially the same between CON and non-CON states. (Unadjusted means are 10.59 visits vs. 10.71 for a difference of -0.125 visits, p-value=0.012). This difference remains small and statistically insignificant across adjustment strategies. The length of service is slightly longer in CON states by an unadjusted 0.673 days (p-value=0.336), but this difference shrinks and becomes statistically insignificant in the adjusted models. However, the frequency of visits is significantly less in CON states across specifications. In the final HRR fixed-effects specification there are 0.011 (p-value<0.001) fewer visits per day in CON states. There are also important differences in the skill mix where the proportion of visits by skilled nursing is 0.049 less and by home health aides is 0.028 more in CON states suggesting a lower intensity of skilled human capital in CON states.
The probability of discharge from the hospital to a home health agency is 1.5 percentage points lower in CON vs. non-CON states (last column of the first row of results in Table   4 ). This 12.6% decline in the rate of discharge to home health is statistically significant, large, and robust to our alternative specifications. There is little difference between the overall adjusted result and the adjusted result in the subsample. The adjusted result is about twice the size of the unadjusted result, and the fixed effect result.
The effect of entry regulation on rehospitalization rates is presented in Medicare expenditures are not statistically different between CON and non-CON states in the fixed-effects specification. This is true within the sample of home health admissions and among all hospital discharges. It is notable that in the unadjusted analysis, expenditure in CON states for patients discharged to home health is nearly $500 higher than in non-CON states, but is reduced close to zero after adjusting for patient mix. Costs are lower in states with CON laws in the adjusted subsample and go up slightly with fixed effects suggesting that the $123 cost difference for 120 days post discharge estimated in the adjusted specification may be a lower bound and that costs within the home health sample may be higher in CON states. For Medicare expenditures among all hospital discharges, costs are lower in the first 30 days in CON states, but this effect is not statistically significant in the most saturated fixed-effects specification. The lower costs in the first 60 days after a hospital discharge is primarily a result of the lower use of home health care services in CON states and most of these costs are offset by higher costs beyond 60 days that can be attributed to the higher rates of rehospitalization.
DISCUSSION
States use a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach across different segments of the health care industry. Regulation of resource utilization, such as CON laws, while used predominantly to regulate capital expansions in the hospital sector, is commonly used in labor-intensive environments such as the home health sector. Instead of regulating capital investment, home health CONs take the form of entry restrictions. 10 As a consequence, it is nearly impossible for a potential home health entrant to demonstrate "need", as incumbent agencies are not constrained by capacity and face few hurdles when it comes to expansion of services. Therefore, not surprisingly, CON regulation of home health leads to concentrated markets with about half the number of agencies compared with states where entry is not regulated using CON.
We find home health care in CON states to be less resource intensive (lower frequency of visits and lower skill mix), yet we did not find meaningful differences in quality based on the fact that there were no detectible differences in rehospitalization rates among patients admitted to home health from the hospital. Hence, the quality effect that we hypothesized was not confirmed, although the level of resource intensity could be viewed as the dimension of "quality" on which home health agencies compete. If this is the case, the stronger intensity of resource use in CON states did not translate into improved quality outcomes. On the other hand, we found no evidence that regulation in home health lowers the rate of hospital readmissions or resource intensity of home health care as suggested by the view that limiting the number of home health agencies through CON focuses monitoring efforts and results in better care. On net, it is possible that the anticompetitive and monitoring effects of CON regulation are canceling each other out.
While the delivery of home health services to those admitted does not appear to be much different in CON states, overall health service delivery is different because CON regulation is associated with 12.6% fewer home health admissions following hospital discharge. This lower rate of home health admissions is accompanied by a slightly higher rate of hospital readmission among all hospital discharges. Moreover, Medicare expenditures overall are similar over 120 days but lower in CON states initially. This suggests that the use of more home health episodes is costly (intensive margins), but because a higher rate of use of home health lowers the likelihood of rehospitalization (extensive margins) and the associated expenditures, this home health use is not associated with a detectible overall change in Medicare expenditures.
CON may not reduce the performance of home health agencies among the patients seen by home health, but because home health in CON is used less frequently following hospital admission, CON has negative implications for the broader health care system.
Although there are no overall differences in total Medicare expenditures, patients are unlikely to be indifferent between the two models of care 
